Birth rate in Kazakhstan: about the “Kazakh phenomenon” and demographic challenges: part 2

Last week, together with Kazakh demographers Zhanna Aubakirova and Alexander Alekseenko from the international research center Digital social research of the D. Serikbayev VKTU, we examined the Kazakhstani features of ethnodemographic development . Continuing the topic, they will talk about how a new demographic system was created based on the Kazakh ethnic group, and share their forecasts regarding the birth rate in the country.

The effect of delayed births

- What are the features of this new demographic system?

- The changes, largely the result of political decisions, occurred very quickly - over three decades. In our opinion, 2010 can be called the conditional starting point for the formation of reproductive attitudes determined by representatives of the Kazakh ethnic group. That year, Kazakhs provided the number of births in our country by 72.5%, and the natural increase - by 93.3%. A statistical reflection of ethnodemographic evolutions is that in 2010–2021, the number of births increased by 21.4% (367.7 thousand in 2010 and 446.5 thousand in 2021). At the same time, the growth dynamics in cities was 7.1 times higher than the growth dynamics in rural areas (36.3% and 5.1%, respectively). This is largely due to the fact that, according to the 2021 population census, the share of Kazakhs in the cities of Kazakhstan was 67.0%, more than half of them were urban residents.

That is, the Kazakh ethnic group increasingly determines the demographic processes in Kazakhstan. To some extent, this is manifested through the prism of the "birth order" indicator. If in 2010, among 367.7 thousand births, first-borns accounted for 40.7%, and those born fourth or more - 13.5%, then in 2021 the situation changed dramatically - among 446.5 thousand births, the share of first-borns was 26.8%, and fourth or more children - already 28.0%. This dynamic was especially clearly observed in cities, where the share of births of the fourth or more children in the family in 2021 compared to 2010 increased by 2.8 times (from 8.5% to 23.8%), while in rural areas - by 1.8 times (from 19.0% to 34.0%).

Such significant changes in the birth order over the decade are unlikely to be explained only by the peculiarities of the demographic attitudes of Kazakh women, who dominate the reproductively active group of the population. The evolution of the age structure in 2010–2021 has a great influence on the process. During this period, the number of women aged 20–29 decreased by 17.9%, and 15–19-year-olds decreased by 19.7%. Due to the small size of the generation under 30, which was mainly born in the crisis 1990s, the proportion of births of the first and second child decreased (from 69.7% in 2010 to 49.7% in 2021).

The trend towards having many children is largely determined by the large generation, which was born mainly in the 1980s. In 2010, when they were 20-29 years old, the proportion of first and second births was 69.7% of all cases. Then, as this generation grew older, the proportion of children born third (from 16.7% in 2010 to 21.0% in 2021), fourth and higher (from 13.5% to 28.0%) gradually increased. The total fertility rate increased by 27.2% and amounted to 3.32 in 2021. At the same time, in cities, the growth dynamics, with rare exceptions, are more pronounced.

Thus, modern demographic evolutions are largely a consequence of the effect of delayed births. The trends in having many children are largely determined by women whose reproductive behavior was formed under the influence of the recent Soviet past.

Reproductive emptiness

- What changes in this regard are expected in the near future?

- Soon, the processes and trends of the birth rate in Kazakhstan will become entirely dependent on the generations that were born during the period of independence and on whom the inertia of previous reproductive attitudes has little influence.

The demographic situation that is forming on a new, sovereign basis has a number of features. On the one hand, the number of representatives of the generation born in the 1990s is small. Therefore, in the future, the number of births will decrease, which is already happening. If 446.5 thousand children were born in Kazakhstan in 2021, then in 2022 - 403.5 thousand, in 2023 - 388.0 thousand. But this does not mean that age-specific fertility rates are also decreasing - in 2010-2021, they grew in all groups, with the exception of 15-19-year-olds, especially in urban areas.

In other words, if there were 73 births per hundred women aged 20–24 in 2010, then in 2021 there were 90. There were 78 births per hundred women aged 25–29 in 2010, and 101 in 2021. As we can see, in 2021, the birth rates of the “new generation” (aged 20–29) were significantly higher than those of the 20–29 generation in 2010, especially in cities. This suggests that the birth rate in the country may increase significantly in the future.

- But the overall rate is also declining...

- The decrease in the TFR (3.32 in 2021; 3.05 in 2022; 2.93 in 2023) does not yet indicate the emergence of a trend towards the "European variant of fertility". The situation is largely determined by the decrease in the number of women of active reproductive age. Thus, the generation born in the 1980s has mostly exhausted its reproductive potential, their contribution to the TFR has decreased. The generation of the 1990s, which largely determines the fertility processes at present, is small in number. Representatives of the generation of the 2000s are just beginning to realize their reproductive potential, and it is very difficult to predict what their attitudes towards fertility will be. This is especially true for the large generation born after 2010.

A temporary "reproductive void" has formed. For several years, the reproduction processes will be in a "suspended" state. And this temporary situation should not be considered the starting point of a new trend, or a strategy for the demographic development of Kazakhstan should be developed on its basis. We can only state that the Kazakhs have "absorbed" the entire range of socio-cultural ideas of the modern world - from traditional to modernizing. But this set has not yet formed into some kind of clear logical structure. Nevertheless, there is a search for interaction of identities that can enrich Kazakhstani society.

In general, in our opinion, the unifying basis of the Kazakh ethnic group is the cultural code, the traditional heritage, which was not lost in the Soviet era and was actively supported by national-patriotic rhetoric in the sovereign period. It is important to see how this cultural code, to one degree or another represented in various layers of Kazakh society, reacts to dynamic socio-economic evolutions. These variations are more clearly demonstrated by the urban population, which forms future birth rates in Kazakhstan. At the same time, it is of great importance that the rural-urban space of the country functions as a single whole, intertwined with a mass of socio-economic, family and cultural threads. This space is connected by a large traditional family, which has not lost its significance.

Three views on motherhood and fatherhood

- What trends related to birth rates will become the main ones in the Kazakh environment in the foreseeable future?

- Our center conducted a sociological study that revealed three groups that determine, to a greater or lesser extent, the birth rate processes in modern Kazakh society. The first of them is the so-called "traditional" group, which produces a significant number of births. Many of its representatives do not have a rational explanation for the high birth rate, and the corresponding attitudes are based on national-patriotic rhetoric. Simply put, people believe that they are fulfilling the task set by the state to increase the number of Kazakhs, for which it is obliged to provide comprehensive support to large families.

That is, this phenomenon is still relevant, but it is quite possible that the situation will change sooner or later, and the inertia of the factors determining the birth rate in this group will dry up. Moreover, all the components of the so-called "Kazakhstani demographic phenomenon" may be neutralized along with this. However, the prospects for the demographic development of the country will not be determined by this, albeit still numerous, layer of Kazakh society.

- The next group, one must assume, approaches this issue more rationally?

- Yes, so let's call it "rational birth rate". Representatives of this group can be characterized by the following social parameters: urban, second or third generation, Kazakh women of reproductive age, mostly with higher education. The attitude to the number of children in the family of these women is different, often polar, so we will divide them into two subgroups.

The first do not plan a large number of births and generally have a negative attitude to the Kazakh peculiarities of having many children. They are characterized by high social autonomy, the absence of influence of relatives, as well as ethnic and religious traditions on demographic behavior.

The second group also has a strict pragmatic approach to the number of children in the family, but the prospect of becoming a mother of many children is acceptable. These women make the corresponding decision based on an analysis of the family's economic situation and their own real possibilities. When planning a family, the future of their children is of great importance to them: mandatory residence in the city, quality education (including outside of Kazakhstan), classes in paid clubs, tutoring services, and language learning. And, if funds allow, many plan to have three, four or more children. At the same time, most of these women do not count on state assistance.

- Who is in the third group?

- This is a small segment of the population representing the political, economic, and cultural establishment of modern Kazakhstan and not experiencing any material problems. Basically, these are fairly young men and women who socialized in the post-Soviet era, many of them received an education at prestigious universities around the world and achieved significant social success. They often have a European mindset and lead a corresponding lifestyle. At the same time, it is among them that large families are most often encountered (it is enough to analyze the published biographical data). This new elite realizes an important function - it demonstrates a modernized standard of the Kazakh family.

In our opinion, the source of this standard formation lies in the ethnocultural sphere. Mass urbanization of Kazakhs, urban lifestyle largely blur interethnic boundaries formed in the agrarian period of history. Therefore, the elite creates a new frame (borders), allowing to preserve the ethnic essence in the standardized urban space. The borderline is the demographic factor. A large family becomes a kind of symbol of ethnicity, "Kazakhness", part of the national-patriotic idea. Such demographic behavior can become a way of adapting traditions to modernized socio-economic conditions.

Mix of Tradition and Modernity

- Is there a future for traditional demographic culture in modern Kazakhstan?

- The peculiarity of the demographic development of modern Kazakhstan is the combination of tradition and modernity. A significant number of Kazakhs entered the era of sovereignty on the basis of traditional culture, which received active support from the political leadership of the country. As a result, this culture, including its demographic component, became a kind of symbol of ethnicity and independence. Therefore, to this day, traditional consciousness, formed by centuries-old agrarian existence, largely determines "modernization existence". That is, both traditional and modernization ideas about life exist simultaneously, there are various socio-cultural views that give rise to a considerable number of dynamically changing intermediate options, often regionally differentiated.

The demographic present of the Kazakhs is largely determined not only in the context of socio-economic, but also socio-cultural, national-patriotic evolutions. It is in this diversity that the demographic prospects of Kazakhstan are formed. And it is very important not to lose this polyphony.

And the danger of such a scenario exists. The idea of ​​birth control is in the air. More and more often, opinions are heard in which its high level is characterized as a challenge, even a threat. We think that in many ways they arise because the socio-economic capabilities of the state do not correspond to the pace of demographic development. Plus, demography was a tool for solving other problems, primarily geopolitical, ethno-cultural, but at the same time it was outside the socio-economic context. Now it is the economic-demographic combination that is becoming the most conflict-prone.

- How can this contradiction be resolved?

- It can be resolved when the determining idea of ​​state development becomes not the economy, but demography, or more precisely, when the former adapts to the latter. However, demography has already begun to play an independent role in the historical sovereign process and largely determines it.

It is important for the state to adequately respond to these demographic challenges, rebuilding its socio-economic and socio-cultural strategy. For example, the current age structure of the population requires an urgent and significant increase in the number of educational and job places, and in the near future the situation will worsen even more. Therefore, it is necessary to create a system of indicators (age and sex structure, population reproduction, migration trends, etc.), through the prism of which the socio-economic situation will be assessed and forecasted.

And it is very important to preserve the cultural background. The development option, when demography was a consequence of socio-economic trends, is demonstrated today by many countries (almost all of Europe, China, South Korea, Japan and other successful economies). The measures taken at the time to reduce the birth rate, explicit or indirect, have led to acute demographic (aging, depopulation, population decline), socio-economic (labor shortage), ethno-political (migration crisis) problems. All attempts to restore the previous birth rate, closely linked to the socio-cultural heritage, have not yet led to success. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to restore the lost family culture and traditions.

Fortunately, they still exist in Kazakhstan. There is an opportunity to create a certain construct that allows successfully combining socio-cultural and modernization development trends. And this should be the basis, the essence of sovereign demographic policy.